The idea of declaring a Chinese diplomat persona non grata was never meant to be floated in public.
It is a scalpel, not a slogan.
Yet the moment it was aired in the Senate, it became applause bait. A line designed to satisfy anger rather than enforce consequence. And while public outrage over Chinese behavior in the West Philippine Sea is justified, states are not governed by outrage. They are governed by discipline.
Chinese embassy rhetoric has crossed diplomatic lines. That much is clear. What is not clear is why the Philippines would choose to weaken its own instruments in response.
Under international law and diplomatic practice, declaring a diplomat persona non grata is the exclusive authority of the executive. It is meant to be executed quietly, decisively, and without spectacle. Its power lies in finality. Once done, the diplomat leaves. No debates. No posturing.
Floating it publicly strips it of force.
It corners the executive into a false dilemma: act rashly or appear weak. It drags foreign policy into domestic performance. And it hands Beijing exactly what it wants: a shift from its own misconduct to Philippine political noise.
China does not respond to public shaming with compliance. It responds with retaliation, delay, or escalation calibrated to remind smaller states of asymmetry. Public threats do not discipline Beijing. They expose Manila.
Markets and allies see this clearly. Diplomatic volatility is not a footnote. It is a risk signal. Capital flees uncertainty long before warships move.
The most dangerous damage, however, is institutional.
Once legislators normalize publicly threatening foreign diplomats, persona non grata ceases to be a sovereign act and becomes a rhetorical habit. Today it is China. Tomorrow it is another envoy. Eventually, the threat becomes meaningless.
This is how states hollow out their authority.
Power that must be announced in advance is already compromised. Sovereignty that depends on applause is already eroding. Institutions that confuse noise for leverage are no longer governing. They are performing.
And here is the charge that should not be dodged: when officials casually brandish tools they do not control, they are not asserting strength. They are committing institutional negligence.
A state that degrades its own instruments of power should not be surprised when those instruments no longer work.
That is not foreign interference. That is self-inflicted weakening.
And history is unforgiving to governments that confuse volume with authority and theater with rule.
They are not overpowered. They are undone.
